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COMPTROLLER AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL
N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1:
The comptroller shall be required: (1) To audit all vouchers
before payment and all official accounts: (2) to audit the accrual
and collection of all revenues and receipts; and (3) to prescribe
such methods of accounting as are necessary for the performance
of the foregoing duties. The payment of any money of the state, or
of any money under its control, or the refund of any money paid
to the state, except upon audit by the comptroller, shall be void,
and may be restrained upon the suit of any taxpayer with the
consent of the supreme court in appellate division on notice to the
attorney-general. In such respect the legislature shall define his
powers and duties and may also assign to him: (1) supervision of
the accounts of any political subdivision of the state; and (2)
powers and duties pertaining to or connected with the assessment
and taxation of real estate, including determination of ratios
which the assessed valuation of taxable real property bears to the
full valuation thereof, but not including any of those powers and
duties reserved to officers of a county, city, town or village by
virtue of sections seven and eight of article nine of this
constitution. The legislature shall assign to him no administrative
duties, excepting such as may be incidental to the performance of
these functions, any other provision of this constitution to the
contrary not withstanding.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
County of Rensselaer v. Regan38
(decided December 31, 1991)
The plaintiffs, consisting of five New York counties
38. 578 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't 1991).
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participating in the STOP-DWI program, 39 challenged a 1990-
1991 State Operations Budget provision (Budget Provision) as
violative of article V, section 140 of the New York State
Constitution because it imposed upon the Comptroller duties not
incidental to his constitutionally sanctioned duties. 4 1 In addition,
the plaintiffs asserted that the Budget Provision violated article
III, section 1,42 and sections 1 and 2 of article IX43 of the New
York State Constitution. The court, affirming the lower court's
decision, 44 found the provision unconstitutional because it
violated article V section 1, the constitutional limitation on
legislative assignment of extraneous administrative duties to the
Comptroller. The court declined to address the plaintiffs'
remaining constitutional claims. 45
In 1981, the New York State Legislature enacted the STOP-
DWI program to encourage localities to institute programs de-
signed to reduce "alcohol-related traffic injuries and deaths
through coordinated efforts within the counties for better en-
forcement, prosecution and prevention of drunken driving." 46
Under STOP-DWI, participating counties are required to present
a proposal to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for his ap-
proval. 47 If the proposal is accepted, the Commissioner thereafter
assumes responsibility for monitoring the program. 4 8 Incentive to
participate in STOP-DWI is supplied by a provision in the statute
39. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1197 (McKinney Supp. 1992) (amending
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW art. 43-A § 1678 (McKinney 1981)).
40. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1.
41. County of Rensselaer, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
42. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this state shall be
vested in the senate and assembly.").
43. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2 (These two provisions relate to the
rights of local governments and the home rule powers of local governments.).
44. County of Rensselaer v. Regan, 573 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County), aff'd, 578 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't 1991).
45. County of Rensselaer, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
46. Id.; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWV § 1197(3)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1992).
47. N.Y. VEH. & TzAF. LAWv § 1197(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
48. See id. § 1197(7)-(8).
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which directs that all fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed in
alcohol-related driving offense prosecutions, by courts of the par-
ticipating county, will be applied to that county's program,
49
rather that added to state revenues.
All New York counties chose to take part in the program.
Subsequently, the 1990-1991 Budget Provision was implemented,
directing the State Comptroller to "'collect, withhold and receive
and deposit. . . up to two percent of revenues received in any
court' pursuant to the STOP-DWI program" in order to subsidize
the budget of the Department of Motor Vehicles. 50 The counties
asserted three arguments attacking the constitutionality of the
1990-1991 Budget Provision: First, the budget provision violated
article V, section 1 of the state constitution because it conferred
duties upon the Comptroller not incidental to those which are
constitutionally sanctioned duties; second, the provision violated
article III, section 1 because it assigned lawmaking duties without
adequate guidelines; and third, the provisions violated sections 1
and 2 of article IX in that the appropriation of county funds
interferes with the home rule powers of the counties. 51
Defendants maintained that the 1990-1991 Budget Provision
merely assigned the Comptroller tasks that were "incidental to
his constitutional functions"' 52 as dictated by the New York
49. Id. § 1197. Section 1197 specifically provides:
Program establishment. (a) Where a county establishes a [STOP-DWI
program] it shall receive fines and forfeitures collected by any court,
judge or magistrate or other officer within the county from [alcohol-
related traffic] violations . . . . Upon receipt of these moneys, the
county shall deposit them in a separate account . . . and they shall be
under the exclusive care, custody and control of the chief fiscal officer
of each county participating in the program."
Id.
50. County of Rensselaer, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
51. Id. at 276. The court based its opinion solely on the article V, section
1 claim. It declined to consider the two other arguments. Id. at 277.
52. Id. Defendants' threshold argument that plaintiffs' lacked standing was
rejected. The court found that the plaintiffs' had standing because they were
asserting a "propriety claim of entitlement to a specific fund." Id. This
"entitlement" was the plaintiffs' entitlement to receive moneys collected by
the courts participating in the STOP-DWI program in accordance with Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1197. Id.
[Vol 8840
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Constitution article V, section 1. The defendants also asserted
that the provision at issue should be construed to withstand the
constitutional objection that it conferred excessive administrative
discretion upon the Comptroller.
In finding the Budget Provision unconstitutional under article
V, section 1 of the New York State Constitution, the court held
that the provision violated "the constitutional limitation on leg-
islative assignment of extraneous administrative duties to the
Comptroller."' 5 3 The court noted that the STOP-DWI legislation
specifically directed funds accumulated from the prosecution of
the designated offenses to the participating counties, and clearly
not to the Comptroller for deposit in the state's general fund. 54
The STOP-DWI legislation is therefore distinguishable from leg-
islation permitting the comptroller to "[set] off an amount due
the State incidental to auditing a claim for payment from State
funds"5 5 because the STOP-DWI funds at no time belong to the
state. Additionally, it is not "merely a direction for the internal
allocation of funds within the State's financial structure." ' 56
Rather, the Budget Provision at issue directed the Comptroller to
collect a portion of the STOP-DWI funds and deposit those funds
in the state's general fund. The court found "no nexus whatso-
ever between this statutorily imposed responsibility and any
auditing or other constitutionally designated function of the
Comptroller." 57 Consequently, the court found the budget pro-
vision to be an unconstitutional assignment of responsibility to
the Comptroller.
The court also acknowledged the significance of the legislative
intent in making its determination. The court stated that
53. Id. at 277.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (distinguishing this case from Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v.
State Ins. Fund, 102 A.D.2d 367, 479 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep't 1984) (where
moneys were transferred from the state insurance fund to the general fund of
New York State), aft'd, 64 N.Y.2d 365, 476 N.E.2d 304, 486 N.Y.S.2d 905,
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985)).
57. Id.
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"elimination of the statutory revenue collection duties of the
Comptroller was apparently one of the objectives of the 1925
amendment to the State Constitution adding article V, section 1
and its prohibition against assignment of administrative
responsibilities not incidental to the Comptroller's primary
auditing functions." 58
58. Id. (citing Patterson v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 714, 724, 363 N.E.2d 1146,
1154, 395 N.Y.S.2d 411, 418 (1977)) ("[The Legislature was precluded from
assigning the Comptroller any administrative duties, save those incidental to
the performance of the Comptroller's constitutional functions.").
842 [Vol 8
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